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Esse in Anima: The problem of Grounding between Jung and Deleuze

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Abstract:

The author investigates an immanent reading of grounding in Jung’s conception of the ground through an examination of the way in which Jung employs esse in anima (soul). Grounding concerns the “gap” between experience and its conditions. Transcendent, transcendental, immanent and immanent-genetic accounts which deal with the problem of the “gap” (or ‘constitutive finitude’) are evident in Jung’s work on the grounding of psychic experience. My argument is undertaken through an engagement with the philosophical thought of Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) with specific reference to his critical re-working of Immanuel Kant’s notion of the Idea. The essay begins by asking why a process of grounding needs to be undertaken by Jung and some of the problems that this process might entail (i.e. determining the ground from the side of the conditioned). The second half of the essay attempts to address how Jung potentially avoids some of these problems through his use of esse in anima. Rarely has the thought of Gilles Deleuze and Jung been aligned in this way. However, doing so may be of value when situating Jung’s thought within a post-structuralist context whilst drawing from elements within his thought directly. I borrow extensively from the work of Paul Bishop (2000) and Christian Kerslake (2002, 2007, 2009) to help forge a path between Jung and Deleuze as both in their respective studies have mined resources in Jung’s work which make this possible. Scholarship which explicitly addresses the notion of a ground in Jung’s depth psychology is scare although not non-existent. Robin McCoy Brooks (2011) and John Dourley (2011) examine “foundationalism” and “ground” respectively. Brooks’ critique is orientated from a philosophical perspective whilst Dourley considers the religious and esoteric heritage from which Jung drew inspiration when attempting to characterise his notion of the ground. Whilst I consider Jung’s foundationalism to be problematic my conclusions differ from those offered by Brooks. Dourley’s findings can be used to support both a transcendent and immanent conception of the ground but they do not challenge the form of identity.

Introduction – why grounding?

We have dreams, we have images, messages, contents, material, “facts” (according to Jung) which emerge from somewhere into consciousness. One might refer to this as ‘psychic experience’. How do we make “sense” of this psychic experience? Would some kind of “ground” not be valuable, one which could explain the conditions (general or genetic) under which or by which such experience emerged? If a ground could be determined then perhaps the “meaning” and “sense” of such experience could be derived providing us a new “common-sense” of psychic experience. Without a ground the “sense” of psychic experience seems to remain “raw”; it requires submission to something to make it known.1 What is curious about psychic experience is that it does not come ‘ready-made’,

1 Dourley has considered what constitutes the “ground” in Jung’s works with specific reference to later conceptions such as the unus mundus (‘one world’) in his paper “Jung’s equation of the ground of being with the ground of psyche”. He argues: ‘Jung does not use the term ‘Ground’ widely in his corpus. Elsewhere he refers to the Buddha’s and the Buddhist’s repose on ‘the eternal ground of his inner nature, whose oneness with Deity, or universal being, is confirmed in other Indian testimonies’ He also relates the ‘Ground’ to ‘the deep root of all being...’ and to a residual Eastern religious fascination with it and its conscious recovery. But in his most telling use of the term he contends that the many images of wholeness common to all religions point to ‘the universal “Ground”, the deity itself’. The Journal of Analytical Psychology, 56 (2011), 515. Cited C.G. Jung, “Gnostic symbols of the Self,” (1951) in Collected Works, vol. 9i, The Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), 304.

2 I respect that “raw” is an ambiguous term to say the least. By raw (material) I mean a certain kind of sense-material. When defining “sensation” Jung writes that it is ‘sense-perception – perception mediated by the sense organs and “body-senses” (kinaesthetic, vasomotor sensation, etc.). It is, on the other hand, an element of
i.e. it is not like the experience we associate with everyday life, from day to day. This latter experience already appears to have a common-sense. In vague and general terms there are numerous areas of common agreement between people about what they sense around them and for many it is positivistic science which “proves” that our processing of sense is in accordance with universal scientific laws.

With respect to psychic experience, early pioneers of depth psychology did not have this luxury, i.e. they did not have a common (albeit inconsistent) tacit agreement about the meaning of important experiences from the psyche. This has been referred to as the problem of the ‘personal equation’ or ‘subjective factor’ in early depth psychology.3 To solve such a problem the introduction of a ground might be of value. Such a ground would have to be as impervious to critique as possible, in short it would have to demonstrate that its method of deduction was as “pure” or unconditioned as possible, and that the ground itself did not contain within it implicit subjective presuppositions whose image was reflected in the common-sense of psychic experience. The value of a process of grounding and the presentation of a ground as unconditioned lends legitimacy to the proper determination of psychic sense. Jung claimed that the psyche was “autonomous” and “objective” and his attempts to account for such claims are part of the process of conferring legitimacy on the proper determination of psychic sense belonging to analytical psychology. Whilst I do not attempt to explore the various contexts in which Jung locates the psyche, different locations could be classed as varying degrees of depth corresponding to what Jung regards as more or less deep legitimacy. Investigation of the depths conferred via a transcendent, transcendental or metaphysical account of grounding is not the concern of this essay. Needless to say these methods of grounding are all evident across Jung’s works.6

Jung’s tendency, according to Robin McCoy Brooks to ‘conflate transcendental, transcendent and immanent principles’7 gestures towards a conflation of different ways of grounding all of which

ideation, since it conveys to the mind the perceptual image of the external object; and on the other hand, it is an element of feeling’. Psychological Types, 793. Yet he also refers to intuition as part of the perceptual process which ‘mediates perceptions in an unconscious way’. Ibid. 770. Jung’s first two senses of “sense” (sense mediation and perceptual image) seem to be capable of being accommodated by Kant’s transcendental logic. Sense is sensible intuition. In this case there is no conception of truth which presupposes the existence of a reality exterior to sense. The mediation of sense by ego-consciousness and its mediation by the unconscious do not alter the passive “sense” that is being mediated. The “truth” of psychic content is still dependent on sense i.e. a “true” cognition (by conscious or unconscious mediation) necessarily points beyond itself to an object or state of affairs that can no longer be posited in reality exterior to sense. The outside world remains relative to the a priori conditions of the transcendental subject (Kant) or the transcendental Self (Jung; this is developed in the main text shortly).

3 The history of this endeavour in early psychology is charted in detail by Shamdasani. See, chap. 1, “The individual and the Universal,” in Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology, 29-99. In his autobiography, Memories, Dreams, Reflections (1962) Jung acknowledges this problem when commenting on Kraft-Ebing’s Textbook of Psychiatry (1890) that he read as a medical student. Borrowing from Nietzsche he writes: ‘My violent reaction set in when Kraft-Ebing spoke of the ‘subjective character’ of psychiatric textbooks. So, I thought, the textbook is in part the subjective confession of the author. With his specific prejudice, with the totality of his being, he stands behind the objectivity of his experiences and responds to the ‘disease of the personality’ with the whole of his own personality.’ Memories, Dreams, Reflections (London: Collins, 1979). [Hereafter MDR], 111. In Beyond Good and Evil (1886) Nietzsche writes: ‘It has gradually become clear to me that every great philosophy has hitherto been: a confession on the part of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir.’ ‘On the Prejudice of Philosophers,’ trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), 6, 37.


7 Brooks, “Un-thought out metaphysics in analytical psychology: a critique of Jung’s epistemological basis for psychic reality,” 497.
have something in common. This concerns a conception of identity which determines the relationship between ground and experience. A ground serves identity when its function subordinates difference to maintain its unity. The problem with a conception of unity which ultimately serves identity is that it limits difference, diversity, change and creativity by imposing deep or absolute limits on the sensible in order to do so. The grounding process presupposes unity but in the image of conditioned identity (the form of the object, or object=x) and it illicits projects this back to account for all possible experience. More or less “illusion” or more or less “lack” of identity between a transcendent ground and experience comes to characterise the judicial role performed by the ground to ensure the unity of ground and subject in experience. Between the ground and experience difference is negatively determined by what Deleuze calls the:

[F]our principle aspects to “reason” in so far as it is the medium of representation: identity in the form of the undetermined concept; analogy, in the relation between ultimate determinable concepts; opposition, in the relation between determinations within concepts; resemblance, in the determined object of the concept itself. 9

In his thorough study Brooks referred to this as the problem of “foundationalism” in Jung. He finds evidence of a ground in Jung which he refers to as Jung’s ‘Archimedean point’ embodied in the Self and Jung’s ‘one-world’ notion, the unus mundus which can be found in his later works. 10 I regard these as two grounds (Self and unus mundus) which share a common form but are located in different contexts of depth. My intention is not to focus on these two wholes 11 but to examine what I regard as the common form and its logical problems from a philosophical perspective. Yet I also seek to challenge this examination of the common form as somehow final in Jung’s thought, by elaborating an account of universal un-grounding or groundlessness in Jung’s use of esse in anima 12; an immanent un-grounding of identity, unity or totality (no matter where this ground may be located).

This investigation may lead to further questioning of what philosophical problems might remain implicit within statements such as the following: ‘Without the realization that the principles of participation and identity are operative in Jungian psychology it remains largely unintelligible and its power of transformation is eviscerated.’ 13

The ground and the psyche

8 Daniela Voss articulates this circularity when she explains that ‘the condition is nothing but the form of possibility fabricated retroactively in the image of the conditioned. Consequently, the general form inscribed in the proposition of knowledge is irrefutable to the extent that it responds exactly to the a priori conditions, which render the proposition possible.’ Conditions of Thought: Deleuze and Transcendental Ideas, 53.


10 “Un-thought-out metaphysics in analytical psychology: a critique of Jung’s epistemological basis for psychic reality,” 503-506.


As a self-confessed “empiricist”\(^\text{14}\) one would assume that Jung is endorsing the empiricist view (inherited from Hume)\(^\text{15}\) that consciousness only begins with experience. However Jung is closer to Kant because both men accept that knowledge does not derive from experience. What grounds in experience is not what we know in experience. Rather what renders cognition possible is not given in experience and this is why its conditions are transcendental and \textit{a priori}.\(^\text{16}\) Jung, like Kant, does not stop at experience. He seeks to determine its ground, its conditions. For Kant the transcendental unity of apperception was the ground, whole, or unity which conditioned all possible experience.

Is there anything similar to be found like Kant’s transcendental subject in Jung’s model of the psyche? In other words, is there any logical isomorphism (however small) between the Kant and Jung with respect to the ground in Kant? I think there is but the evidence is thin. Before considering the evidence a little more attention will be focussed on Kant’s transcendental subject of pure apperception. In the \textit{First Critique (The Critique of Pure Reason, 1781)} he writes:

\begin{quote}
All the manifold of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to the “I think” in the same subject in which the manifold is found. I call it pure apperception [or \textit{original} apperception], to distinguish it from empirical apperception […] because it is that self-consciousness which, while generating the representation “I think” […] cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation.\(^\text{17}\)
\end{quote}

Patrick Hayden offers a number of useful elaborations on this passage:

For Kant, experience is possible only if the subject identifies and recognises spatio-temporal appearances on the basis of the \textit{a priori} concepts of the understanding that are not themselves dependent on experience. Thus, according to Kant, there must be a pure subject not of real experience


\(^{15}\) According to Gilles Deleuze, unlike Hume’s psychological account of the subject, ‘Kant’s transcendental subject is distinguished from empirical or psychological subjectivity’ \textit{What is Grounding?} [hereafter \textit{WIG?}] (1956-7). Transcript. Pierre Lefebvre, trans. Arjen Kleinherenbrink, (eds.) Tony Yanick, Jason Adams & Mohammad Salemy, (Michigan: &\& Publishing), 29. Christian Kerslake has carried out a careful examination of Deleuze’s text and with respect to this passage comments that ‘It is no longer a question of ‘fact’ (\textit{quid facti}) – of what we happen to know through empirical observation or science – but of how \textit{we think we know} such ‘facts’. The possibility of a direct correspondence between our \textit{a priori} ideas and the world itself (intellectual intuition) is ruled out. \textit{Immanence and the Vertigo of Philosophy.} “Introduction: The Problem of Immanence,” (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 17; emphasis as original.

\(^{16}\) Brooks writes that, ‘Kant’s transcendental philosophy was contained within a foundationalist ‘problematical’. Fundamental to foundationalism is the basic belief that there \textit{was} a basis for knowledge and that this basis was derived from \textit{a priori} postulates. Hence, \textit{a priori} meaning was indubitable, infallible, and universally known \textit{without} reference to historical or contemporary contexts (Horne 2008). Such knowledge tends to provide a kind of tacit \textit{certainty} and \textit{permanence} that at the same time overshadows particular, impermanent and provisional realities. It was to Kant’s doctrine of the phenomenal (known) and noumenal (unknown) realms that Jung turned to ground his theorizing about the psyche.” “Un-thought out metaphysics in analytical psychology: a critique of Jung’s epistemological basis for psychic reality,” 495; emphasis added.

but instead of possible experience that possesses an original “objective” unity independent of the manifold given in intuition. The Kantian transcendental apperception functions to bring the diversity of appearances under a single common representation. The very notion of objective appearances presupposes the unity of the subject, of the “I think” as the condition of possible experience.\(^{18}\)

Kant concludes that the transcendental unity of apperception is the necessary condition of any possible experience. In other words, possible experience consists in the knowledge and representation of objects imposed by a single self-conscious subject that is itself a deduction and not an intuition. The transcendental self-consciousness imposes the categorical schema on its diverse intuitions, subjecting this passively intuited diversity to the pure concepts of the understanding. Time is thereby subordinated by Kant to the active synthetic unity of the transcendental subject, which is imposed upon the passive phenomenal subject by something other than itself.\(^{19}\)

A number of terms have been generated in these passages, some of which have been noted already (e.g. ‘possible experience’, “unity”). The idea I want to pursue is that of the imposition of conditions of possibility on “experience”. That which imposes is independent of that which is imposed upon and the extent of this independence or externality may be problematic. For example, Deleuze criticises Kant for reducing the determination of the given to the external application of concepts. I will return to this shortly.

Bishop’s close examination of Jung’s early Zofingia Lectures (1896-99)\(^{20}\) provides some evidence of the similarity and difference between what Jung came to call the “psyche” and Kant’s transcendental subject:

Claiming to base himself on Schopenhauer, Jung argues that both conscious and unconscious functions are common to a transcendental subject, which Jung terms the ‘soul’ […] Second, Jung claims in 1897 that the soul is independent of space and time (and therefore in this sense beyond them): whilst recognising that space and time are only categories of the understanding (more properly, they are the forms or conditions of sensory intuition) Jung then equates the soul with the ‘Ding an sich’. Going beyond the limits of [Kant’s Critique] where Kant’s transcendental dialectic merely posits the unity of the thinking subject, i.e. transcendental apperception, Jung here identifies the transcendental subject with the ‘Ding an sich’ […] Jung’s understanding of the transcendental subject (which he then called the soul) is identical with his view in the ‘Thirties and Forties […] of the transcendental subject (which he now called psyche) […] By failing to appreciate to what extent Nietzsche’s philosophy was post-Kantian, indeed anti-Kantian philosophy, Jung may have also missed the chance to examine more carefully his own precarious use of Kant.\(^{21}\)

The context of this passage needs some consideration. Bishop selects from Jung’s second of the Zofingia Lectures titled “Some Thoughts on Psychology” (given in May 1897) in which Jung quoted Kant some thirteen times. But, according to Bishop, Jung also offers in this lecture a “defence of vitalism, and he identifies this vitalism with the Will to Life or ‘life force […] On Jung’s account, this vital principle extends beyond consciousness and by this he means that it is purely instincual, unconscious.”\(^{22}\) Clearly this passage alludes to the importance of Schopenhauer over Kant with respect to the location of Jung’s ground and also its status as “beyond” experience. The location of


\(^{19}\) Ibid.


\(^{22}\) Ibid.

24 Nonetheless it is an extremely important question. In the Zofingia Lectures the “location” of the soul as a thing-in-itself means that it is more than a transcendental postulate. It may be beyond experience but it is not simply immanent to experience. In other words it is not deduced in the same way that Kant deduced the transcendental subject. The aim of Kant’s transcendental project is to discover criteria immanent to the understanding that are capable of distinguishing between two different uses of the syntheses of consciousness: legitimate immanent uses, and illegitimate transcendent uses (the transcendent Ideas). Daniel W. Smith, “Deleuze, Kant, and the Theory of Immanent Ideas,” in Deleuze and Philosophy, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 47. Likewise Lord comments: ‘Immanence and the transcendental are neatly conjoined for Kant. Things that appear to us have conditions of possibility that are transcendental – pertaining to representational and conceptual thought – but not transcendent. This means that the principles that serve as transcendental conditions, and our search for and use of those principles, are “immanent” in a Kantian sense: they remain within the bounds of possible experience. Principles that profess to pass beyond those bounds are transcendent, and generate transcendental illusions. So for Kant, concepts and representations are immanent as long as they apply to objects of possible experience, and ideas are used immanently as long as they only regulate and determine thinking.” “Deleuze and Kant,” In The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze, 95-96. Jung is not concerned with a restricted notion of immanence as ‘immanent to the understanding’. Rather Jung seeks after that which is beyond “legitimate” for the understanding. How Jung grounds criteria immanent to the psyche remains the central concern of this essay.

25 “Ground, Transcendence and Method in Deleuze’s Fichte,” in At the Edges of Thought, 152.

26 It is also “modern” to the extent that emerging conceptions of the unconscious in the nineteenth century derived, according to Matt Ffytche, from the holes or gaps left by Kant’s account of the necessary and logical conditions of subjectivity. Much of Ffytche’s book can be read as a history of the post-Kantian project of

Jung’s transcendental subject (“soul”/“psyche”) in the noumenal significantly problematises its status as “transcendental” in the Kantian sense.

Where is the transcendental located? Perhaps it is not located anywhere, neither in a “mind” or “brain” nor in the noumenal. Anyhow this is not the right question to ask. Rather we need to understand what is new about the transcendental as Kant understood it. It is the founding of the modern concept of the subject as ‘constitutive finitude’. Joe Hughes, drawing from Deleuze’s 1980 lecture course on Leibniz, explains how Deleuze:

draws a sharp distinction between the classical conception of the subject and the modern Kantian subject. For Kant, Deleuze says, the thinking subject is not a thinking thing or created thing. It is rather ‘the form of grounding’. To conceive of the subject in this way is to treat the ‘finite ego’ (moi) as first principle [...] the modern subject is no longer an effect but a cause. It is conceived not as constituted finitude, but as constitutive finitude, an act of self-transcendence through which it constitutes not only itself but, at the same time, founds the world.

Deleuze praises Kant’s discovery of the transcendental. He writes that it marks what is “modern” about modern philosophy. In his magnum opus, Difference and Repetition (1968) Deleuze...
writes that ‘of all philosophers, Kant is the one who discovered the prodigious domain of the transcendental. He is the analogue of the great explorer – not of another world, but of the upper or lower reaches of this one’.27 Deleuze praises the ‘greatest initiative of transcendental philosophy’28 as the introduction of that which fractures the subject:

The consequences of this are extreme: my undetermined existence can be determined only within time as the existence of a phenomenon, of a passive, receptive phenomenal subject appearing within time. As a result, the spontaneity of which I am conscious in the “I think” cannot be understood as the attribute of a substantial and spontaneous being, but only as the affection of a passive self which experiences its own thought – its own intelligence, that by virtue of which it can say I - being exercised in it and upon it but not by it. Here begins a long and inexhaustible story: I is an other [...] Time signifies a fault or fracture in the I and a passivity in the self, and the correlation between the passive self and the fractured I constitutes the discovery of the transcendental, the element of the Copernican Revolution.29

For Deleuze the success of Kant’s ‘transcendental initiative’ is short-lived because time is ‘subordinated by Kant to the active synthetic unity of the transcendental subject, which is imposed upon the passive phenomenal subject by something other than itself.’30 In short, Kant’s conception of unity (drawn from his overvaluation of the faculty of the Understanding)31 is deployed to ensure that the unity of subject-identity is maintained. Although an identity between the object and the a priori is undermined in Kant’s critical philosophy, the form of identity is reintroduced by his determination - his “facts”32 - of the a priori categories and the pure intuitions. These are ‘copied off’ or entail a “conformism” between the conditions and the conditioned. This is a vicious circle ‘that made the condition (the possible) refer to the conditioned (the real) while reproducing its image.’33 Unity in Kant’s critical philosophy is ultimately modelled on identity.

For Deleuze what was of value about Kant’s (short-lived) discovery of the transcendental was that it introduced time into the very structure of subjectivity. He tells us that ‘we should be concerned with a precise moment within Kantianism, a furtive and explosive moment which is not even continued by Kant, much less by post-Kantianism.’34 Deleuze identifies the explosive “moment” with dealing with the problem of constitutive finitude and how this gave rise to discussions about the unconscious as a site of grounding finitude. Ffytche engages in a thorough manner with the work of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814). See “A general science of the I: Fichte and the crisis of self-identification,” in The Foundation of the Unconscious: Schelling, Freud and the Birth of the Modern Psyche (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 37-74. Fichte’s attempt at a genetic account of grounding the conditions of experience (along with that of Salomon Maimon, 1753-1800) have more recently been situated in light of their influence on and use by Deleuze in his genetic account of grounding (see note, 63). The idea of genesis will be considered in the second half of this essay with respect to esse in anima.

27 Gilles Deleuze, DR, 171.
28 Ibid., 109.
29 Ibid., 109.
30 Hayden, Multiplicity and Becoming, 21.
31 See Kerslake, “Deleuze, Kant and the Question of Metacritique,” 494.
32 That is the presupposition of a priori “facts” about cognition. ‘Kant relied on what he himself called ‘facts, for which he then searches for conditions. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant does more than simply claim that reason implies a priori knowledge; he adds that the so called ‘universal’ knowledges of pure sciences such as mathematics are the knowledges in which reason necessarily manifests itself.’ Daniel W. Smith, “Deleuze, Kant and the Transcendental Field,” in At the Edges of Thought: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Philosophy, 29.
Elsewhere Smith has written that ‘Kant simply assumed that there were a priori ‘facts’ of reason (the ‘fact’ of knowledge in the first critique, and the ‘fact’ of morality in the second critique) and then sought the ‘condition of possibility’ of these facts in the transcendental.’ “Deleuze, Kant, and the Theory of Immanent Ideas,” in Deleuze and Philosophy, 49.
34 Ibid., 70.
Kant’s new conception of time. Time is no longer defined as a cosmological or psychological time but as a form of interiority. This is a pure and empty form of time.\textsuperscript{35}

At this moment, Deleuze and foreground and affirm the genetic potential of the transcendental subject (its status as virtual or pure unformed), before it is confirmed as a formal principle of mediation. Deleuze holds Kant in the cataclysmic moment of his machinery, inside the disequilibrated self, unequal to itself, where problematising Ideas can pass. This marks the persistence and insistence of the Idea/thinker encounter – the\textit{necessity} – of Kant’s machinery, the\textit{imperative} of his problem – intensifying the untimely moment of the encounter, the caesura that draws an asymmetrical time-line through the coherence of the self, into the ontological genesis of what can be affirmed before the purity of its difference is mediated in the recognisable.\textsuperscript{36}

What Deleuze praises is the effect that Kant’s fracture has on God or that which had formally guaranteed the unity of the subject. Prior to Kant unity had been guaranteed often by appeal to a God, a God who would never deceive us (e.g. Descartes).\textsuperscript{37} God suffers a ‘speculative death’\textsuperscript{38} and is relegated to “regulative” status meaning that God no longer has the power to think the sum total of reality, nor to determine or generate being internally in thought. This happens because for Kant the intellect is forbidden from being able to delve ‘behind the sensible curtain of the object in an act of\textit{intellectual intuition} and to identify the thought of a noumenal substance with anything in the domain of appearance.’\textsuperscript{39} From here Kant moves to determine that ‘intellectual representations are illegitimate\textit{unless} related to the structure of empirical cognition, based on empirical intuitions’.\textsuperscript{40}

Yet after opening up a fracture between “I” and passive self Deleuze thinks that Kant effectively collapses it as ‘the fracture is quickly filled by a\textit{new form of identity} – namely, active synthetic identity.’\textsuperscript{41} He also makes the following pertinent remark:

\begin{quote}
It is sometimes argued that a considerable philosophical change took place between pre- and post-Kantianism – the former being defined by the negative of limitation, the latter by the negative of opposition; the one by the analytic identity the other by synthetic identity; the one from the point of view of infinite substance, the other from the point of view of finite self. […] However the importance of such changes is open to question. For a philosophy of difference it matters little whether the negative is understood in terms of limitation or opposition, or whether identity is taken to be analytic or synthetic,
\end{quote}

35 The ‘pure and empty form of time’ or purely formal time inaugurated by Kant, is distinguished by Deleuze from time’s modal character as the measure of movement, its feature since the ancient Greeks. Deleuze declares this pure formal time ‘out of joint’ (as uttered by Hamlet). He says that “[t]ime has ceased to be the number of nature, time has ceased to be the number of periodical movement […] it shakes of all subordination to a movement or a nature, it becomes time in itself for itself […] It measures nothing anymore.’ Lecture Courses on Kant at the University of Vincennes (1978) [http://deleuzelectures.blogspot.co.uk/2007/02/on-kant.html].

Voss comments that ‘with the modern conception of time something fundamental has changed: the cosmological harmony between the world and the heavens, man and the heavenly gods, has somehow broken down.’\textit{Conditions of Thought: Deleuze and Transcendental Ideas}, 214.


37 Deleuze writes that ‘Descartes could draw his conclusion only by expelling time, by reducing the Cogito to an instant and entrusting time to the operation of a continuous creation carried out by God. More generally, the supposed identity of the I has no other guarantee than the unity of God himself. For this reason, the substitution of the point of view of the “I” for the point of view of “God” has much less importance than is commonly supposed, so long as the former retains an\textit{identity} that it owes precisely to the latter. God\textit{survives} as long as the I enjoys a subsistence, a simplicity and an identity which express the entirety of its resemblance to the divine.’\textit{DR}, 109; emphasis added.

38 This is what Kant saw so profoundly in the\textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, at least at one point: the manner in which the speculative death of God entails the fracture of the I, the simultaneous disappearance of rational theology and rational psychology. Deleuze,\textit{DR}, 109.


40 Ibid., 486; emphasis added.

41\textit{DR}, 109; emphasis added.
once difference is already reduced to the negative and subordinated to identity. The oneness and identity of the divine substance are in truth the only the guarantee of a unique identical self, and God is retained so long as the Self is preserved. Finite synthetic self or divine analytic substance: it amounts to the same thing. That is why the Man-God permutations are so disappointing, and do not advance matter one step.42

For Deleuze we see that before or after Kant there is not much which does not amount to ‘the same thing’.43 Daniela Voss elaborates on this:

The Kantian critique of traditional metaphysics, in particular of the three branches of rational theology, rational cosmology, and rational psychology, contested the truth of established speculative Ideas such as the existence of God or the existence of an immortal soul. Hitherto, God had played the role of the guarantor God, who construes the identity of the subject by creating man in his own image and who judges the subject in accordance with divine laws […] According to Deleuze no fundamental change has taken place so long as the identity of the subject is still preserved. The issue of critique is crucial, but Kant’s critique of speculative metaphysics did not go far enough. God is retained inasmuch as the place of God is kept in tact […] The Kantian subject has conserved its identity, which grounds the harmonious accord of the faculties.44

Hence the positive constitutive finitude that Deleuze initially lauds in Kant’s opening of the transcendental is quickly replaced or filled by the role that Kant’s transcendental subject performs for ensuring the synthetic identity of the self. The ground of identity remains. Indeed the three terminal points of metaphysics – the Self (identity of the person as well-founded agent), the World (identity of the world as its ambient environment) and God (the ultimate foundation) have not been superseded or rather it is their form which has not.

I have moved very rapidly here and may be in danger of neglecting the relevance of any of this to Jung’s model of the psyche. By equating the “soul” or “psyche” with the Ding an sich (noumenal) we may ask if the fracture/gap rendered by the “modern” notion of the subject as constitutive finitude gets reconfigured by Jung in some way.45 We need to recall that the general logic that Kant drew upon and the transcendental logic that he developed to determine the relevance (or “facts”) of cognition, find no counterpart in Jung’s model of the psyche (including, for example, archetypes-as-such, functions, types and so on). Kant’s transcendental conditions of possibility do not refer to the thing-in-itself or the noumenal, rather they are “pure” and “necessary” conditions for knowledge “immanent” to possible experience. Voss and Lundy note that:

Kant presupposed a priori facts about cognition, i.e. forms and categories that were supposed to secure an objective standard of knowledge, but the German idealists found his justification wanting. Kant’s transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding is built on formal logic: it takes as its inspiration the Aristotelian table of logical forms of judgement and proceeds by logical inference.46

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42 Ibid., 70; emphasis added. Interestingly after an exacting examination of Jung’s Kantianism in terms of the relationship between archetype and category, thing-in-itself and unconscious, Bishop notes that “[s]uch definitions took Jung, despite his disclaimers, not only back to pre-Kantian thought, but also beyond the critical philosophy into the post-Kantian realms of late German Idealism and Romantic philosophy.’ *Synchronicity and Intellectual Intuition*, 192.
43 Ibid.
44 *Conditions of Thought: Deleuze and Transcendental Ideas*, 211-212; emphasis added.
45 This is the point of Brooks’ paper, i.e. how Jung closes the “gap” of constitutive finitude by creating bridges (*esse in anima*, the psychoid archetype) to the thing-in-itself, the absolute.
46 Daniela Voss and Craig Lundy, ‘Introduction: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Thought’, in *At the Edges of Thought: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Philosophy*, ed. Craig Lundy and Daniela Voss (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 5. Brooks similarly notes that, ‘Our knowledge or understanding of the objects we experienced was nevertheless a priori (pre-existing knowledge independent of experience) because it was cognized through the universal ‘categories’, an idea Kant borrowed from Aristotle (ibid., B 105). Kant’s categories were general, formal or structural concepts (such as substance, time, space, necessity and causality) which applied to the things we intuited because ‘only through [them was] it possible to know anything as an object’ (Kant 2007/1781, B 125).’ “Un-thought-out metaphysics in analytical psychology: a critique of Jung’s epistemological basis for psychic reality,” 496.
In addition to formal logic Kant’s transcendental logic:

goess much further than general logic can ever go. He explains that general logic only considers the logical form of our cognitions and their relation with one another, hence it abstracts from all content, that is, from any relation of our cognitions to the object. Transcendental logic, by contrast, has to do with pure concepts of the understanding insofar as they are related to objects. Therefore transcendental logic provides a further criterion of truth: namely the requirement that pure concepts can be constructed in the formal intuition of space and time and thus be related to an object; for without the relation to a possible object of experience, a cognition will completely lose its content and hence all truth.\(^{47}\)

Jung’s focus on psychic experience means that the “empirical” material/content/data of his investigations must differ significantly from those of Kant. We have seen that in the Zofingia Lectures Jung seeks to equate the psyche with the noumenal and claims that it is beyond time and space. Hence, Kant’s transcendental logic, based on pure concepts constructed in the formal intuition of space and time, would be ruled out by Jung. Indeed Bishop makes a partially related point when he writes that, [w]hereas Kant decreed universal validity for the categories, Jung argued that activities of the understanding and reason should no longer be regarded as processes subject to the laws of logic, but rather as psychic functions corresponding to the personality.\(^{48}\)

The context of the implicit post-Kantian move Jung appears to make in the second of the Zofingia Lectures concerns Jung’s positive affirmation of vitalism (an alternative form of change to the spatio-temporal causality and mechanism privileged by Kant in the first Critique), as well as the influence of Schopenhauer’s notion of the Will. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this essay to present any assessment of Jung’s “vitalism” it might be worth noting that in this early lecture there is evidence of Jung’s commitment to some kind of purpose in nature.\(^{49}\) Bishop writes that ‘[a]ccording to Jung in 1897 the ‘soul’ has two important characteristics. First it is intelligent, by which Jung appears to imply some kind of entelechy at work.’\(^{50}\) We have already come across the second characteristic that the soul is beyond space and time. Beyond (Kantian) space and time there is an alternative causality and Bishop argues that this designates what he refers to as Jung’s ‘metaphysic of purpose’.\(^{51}\) According to Jung this alternative kind of causality leads to the Ding an sich which, writes Bishop, ‘guarantees the continuity between the world of perception and the realm of transcendence.’\(^{52}\)


\(^{49}\) The topic of Jung’s vitalism interests me a great deal. Whilst in the early lectures Jung appears to endorse a kind of purpose in nature Bishop claims that this is not evident in later work (citing evidence from his 1912 and 1928 essays on psychic energy. However the evidence is conflictual and Jung appears to change his position, or rather after the kind of finality he ascribes to, at different times. Whether this finality accords with an internal finalism as speculated by Kant (whilst always remaining regulative only), or an external finality (Leibniz) or indeed a finality in a ‘special sense’ (a kind of external finality favoured by Henri Bergson) is a topic that I am currently investigating with respect to an AHRC-funded project at The University of Essex “One World”: Logical and Ethical Implications of Holism: www.oneworldprojectholism.wordpress.com. Existing work that has considered Jung’s teleology includes Marilyn Nagy’s Philosophical Issues in the Psychology of C.G. Jung (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 209-259; Ann Addison, “Jung: Vitalism and the ‘psychoid’: An historical reconstruction,” Journal of Analytical Psychology 54, no. 1 (2009): 123-142; Sonu Shamdasani, Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology: The Dream of a Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 180-181; Bishop, “Finality and Synchronicity,” in Synchronicity and Intellectual Intuition, 31-36.

\(^{50}\) The Dionysian Self, 32.

\(^{51}\) Ibid., 37.

\(^{52}\) The Dionysian Self, 36-37; emphasis added. Bishop extracts the following passage from Jung: ‘Causality leads us to a Ding an sich for which we cannot account further, to a cause whose nature is transcendental.
Hence there seems to be some pre-established agreement between the noumenal and perception. The Ding an sich as only temporarily limiting, implies that it is constitutive of our experience and that “knowledge” of it (via intuition) does not have to remain regulative. This is consistent with what Bishop has elsewhere described as Jung’s “unusual” definition of the thing-in-itself:

for Kant things-in-themselves or noumena remain unknowable because they are beyond sensory intuition and conceptualisation, outside the categories of the understanding, and hence, for us, outside space and time. In his lecture, however, Jung spoke of the Ding an sich as “everything that eludes our perception, everything of which we have no tangible mental image” [...] but he also claimed bizarrely “before their discovery X-rays represented a Ding an sich to the same degree as the objects of the postulates of pure reason – God, freedom, and immortality”. Yet in Kant’s critical philosophy, God, freedom and immortality are not the objects of the postulates of pure practical reason, for these three transcendental ideas are the postulates of pure practical reason. Indeed, Kant regards precisely such an attempt to see these ideas as objects as inevitably leading to contradiction. 53

The recovery of the Ding an sich is not absent in Deleuze’s ‘transcendental empiricism’ however by this I do not mean that it aligns with the “unusual” and “bizarre” interpretation of Jung’s definition. In seeking after a genesis of “real” experience Deleuze ‘wants to recover a more determinate version of Kant’s noumenon: one that does not have a transcendent relation to phenomena. This appears at odds with Jung’s “unusual” interpretation of the Ding an sich which suggests that noumena do have a “transcendent” albeit accessible relation to phenomena. Deleuze writes: ‘Difference is not the phenomenon but the noumenon closest to the phenomenon […] Every phenomenon refers to an inequality by which it is conditioned. Every diversity and every change refers to a difference which is its sufficient reason.’ This noumenon is not an “object” to be recovered; it is the internal difference immanent to the phenomenon and it is non-empirical, ‘equal to the genesis that sensation and its forces provide.’ This noumenon is not indeterminate despite being non-empirical, it is the:

‘very being of the sensible. It is not given but that by which the given is given. It is therefore in a certain sense the imperceptible [insensible]. It is imperceptible precisely from the point of view of recognition – in other words, from the point of view of an empirical exercise of the senses in which sensibility grasps only that which also could be grasped by other faculties,

[transcendent]. In this sense the category of causality must be interpreted as a totally wondrous a priori reference to causes of a transcendental [transcendent] nature, i.e. to a world of the invisible and incomprehensible, a continuation of material nature into the incalculable, the immeasurable and the inscrutable. ‘Thoughts on the Nature and Value of Speculative Enquiry,” (1898) in The Zofingia Lectures, par. 184.

53 Synchronicity and Intellectual Intuition, 89, 90-91. Cited, C.G. Jung, “Thoughts on the Nature and Value of Speculative Enquiry,” (1898) in The Zofingia Lectures, par. 196, 198. Is Jung’s interpretation of Kant not somewhat consistent with the ‘two-objects’ or ‘two-worlds’ view in which the thing-in-itself is evaluated in isolation from the activity of the constitutive activity of the transcendental subject? Here “ordinary” objects exist both as we represent them and as they are in-themselves. In-themselves they exist prior to the process of cognition and are what the process is unable to reach. Hence there is a lack; the inability of cognition to reach transcendent objects as things-in-themselves. Jung’s interpretation ultimately undoes the lack/inability. The psyche would merely provide such objects to a passive ego-subject. Both Jung and Kant seem to rate the activity of genesis more highly than the ‘two-objects’ interpretation would allow. The ‘object=x’ of Kant is not to be confused with the thing-in-itself. Whereas Kant determines the activity of genesis too much from the side of the conditioned (empirical experience), Deleuze seeks to locate genesis not in the subject or objects but in a deeper ontological relation that forms the internal structure of his virtual Idea.


55 DR, 280.

and is related within the context of a common sense to an object which also must be apprehended by the faculties.\textsuperscript{57}

Whilst it might be tempting to conclude that the imperceptibility of the being of the sensible requires a kind of intellectual intuition for its perceptibility this is not what Deleuze has in mind. For Deleuze the conditions of the imperceptible must be thought, conditions which force themselves upon our thought via a fundamental or violent ‘encounter’.\textsuperscript{58} For Deleuze this noumenon is not something that exists to be recovered in time. It is not a transcendent thing or object, but a virtual problem that he refers to as an “Idea”. Likewise the imperceptibility of the Idea is not meant to denote a negative “lack” i.e. the inability of cognition to become adequate to the Idea. As a problematic virtual structure which realises itself as actual structures which are never adequate to the problematic virtual Idea-as-such, the Idea is a transcendental condition but one whose immanence is not relative to possible experience alone.

At this stage it is difficult to say much more about this given that it would be to sprint before being able to walk. Needless to say there is no identity between the undetermined “Idea” and its self-determination as actual solutions in the realm of the sensible. Hence there is no identity between the noumenon (virtual problematic Idea) and the actual. As we have seen this cannot be the case for Jung given his view of the Ding an sich as something which is pre-determined but which has not yet been realised. This pre-determined Ding-an-sich may function to provide unity to the subject of psychic experience because psychic experience does not differ, does not remain fractured, from the Ding-an-sich. The psyche as Ding-an-sich seems to be somewhat equivalent to an infinite intellect in which the identity between psychic experience and determination are grounded, beyond space and time. Psychic experience is little more than a copy of a possible reality determined in advance. These are points to which I turn throughout the remainder of this essay.

Jung’s response to the speculative death of God (analytic identity) may well entail the form of its resurrection in his version of the transcendental subject as psyche. The transcendental psyche subordinates difference in terms of the negative of limitation, and its does so for the purpose of guaranteeing the pre-established accord between perception and the thing-in-itself. That the noumenal is not entirely distant means in principle that we can become adequate to the infinite implying that we are limited so long as we are not adequate or not involved in the process of becoming adequate. If the ground or conditions of all possible psychic experience are located in the noumenal then these conditions are immanent to the noumenal.\textsuperscript{59} As necessary conditions of psychic experience they differ completely from Kant’s logical conditions of possibility yet they have a similar effect given that the form of identity remains. A genetic account of the conditions of experience is not fulfilled despite Jung’s dramatic enlargement of what experience can be taken to be. The imposition of identity performed by the psyche (a Man-God permutation) bootstraps what might otherwise be an immanent transcendental field to the coordinates of a ground as the form of identity. This process can also be identified in Jung’s notion of the Self and unus mundus. He continues and reinforces a long philosophical tradition which makes the form of identity itself transcendent and in so doing the “psyche” - which is supposed to be non-rational, autonomous and unconditioned - is accounted for from the side of the rationally conditioned. Jung deepens the form of the identical not only to underpin the legitimacy of his ground but also because of his debt to Kant. Whilst numerous commentators have sought to claim how different Jung’s avowed Kantianism is from Kant,\textsuperscript{60} from a

\textsuperscript{57} DR. 176.

\textsuperscript{58} DR. 176.

\textsuperscript{59} In the definitions section of Psychological Types (1921) Jung refers to the Self as a ‘transcendental postulate’ and he refers to apperception as a ‘psychic process by which a new content is articulated with similar, already existing contents in such a way that it becomes understood, apprehended, or “clear.”’ (C.G. Jung, Psychological Types (1921), in Collected Works, vol. 6 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971), 789, 683). Yet his definition of the Self is problematic as he claims that whilst it can be described only in part […], for the other part, [it] remains at present unknowable and illimitable.’ (ibid., 789; emphasis added). In addition he writes that the Self ‘encompasses both the experienceable and the inexperienceable (or the not yet experienced).’ (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{60} For a summary of Kant’s philosophy and its relationship to Jung’s psychology, see Stephanie de Voogd, “Fantasy versus Fiction: Jung’s Kantianism Appraised,” 204-28; Paul Bishop, Synchronicity and Intellectual Intuition: Huskinson, Nietzsche and Jung, 75-78; Roger Brooke, Jung and Phenomenology, 120-122; Wolfgang Giegerich, “The Rescue of the World,” Shamdasani, Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology, 235-239.
Deleuzian perspective we might see that Jung works within a Kantian horizon and that it is this which contributes to the restoration of identity within his depth psychology.61

There may be many contradictory ways in which Jung attempted to close the fracture of constitutive finitude that Kant opened up (only to close it also) and I cannot do justice to them here. In the simplest of terms Jung’s identification of the noumenal and the psyche on some occasions and, on the other hand, his tendency to ascribe a transcendental status to it and its structures,62 may well involve a ‘before and after Kant’ movement but, as Deleuze might have it, it merely ‘amounts to the same thing’. The fracture is filled, covered over or concealed by a transcendental psyche or transcendent psyche (divine understanding or ‘intellectus archetypus’) by a form of identity required to ensure the unity of the subject-psyche identity. Kant required a self-identical subject that could reliably think about itself and its own projects lest the whole critical enterprise collapsed in on itself. Jung ‘critical enterprise’ may be modest in comparison but it is evident in his attempts to overcome the conceptual relativism of the personal equation and gain greater legitimacy for his depth psychology. Instead of timeless/universal categories there is a psychological a priori which can be deduced.63 Jung may dramatically enlarge the limits of critique but limits remain, ultimately wedded to a self-identical subject-psyche precisely in order to conceal the differential conditions of its own genesis. When Jung yearns to go “beyond” Kant (as many writers claim) this “beyond” ‘amounts to the same thing’, i.e., to locating the form of the identical elsewhere (usually “deeper” as more overtly “metaphysical”) whilst not disengaging from its form: ‘For Jung’s system drives relentlessly towards a psychic monism which proclaims a unity or Absolute.’64 There is still an “outside” to the limits established by Jung’s “critique” (i.e. Jung’s attempts to account for the immanent genesis of the givens of psychic experience). The psyche is “outside” and transcendent – a ‘unity superior to everything [or] a Subject that is an act operating the synthesis of things’.65 The implicit subjective presuppositions which constitute Jung’s inability to engage with this “outside” are the effect of what Deleuze might refer to as a ‘dogmatic image of thought’.66 Jung’s version of the Kantian transcendental codes thought in accordance with the normative form of identity and an order of power establishing it as an apparatus of power itself. For Kant as well as for Jung there is a presupposition of an affinity between thought and truth although for Jung this is more subtle given that “thought” is broadened to include a non-representational logic in psychic experience. With respect to Jung we often see how the conditions and postulates of the dogmatic image of thought produce a non-representational transcendental logic, that is, a logic that relates the dimension of sense to the a priori structure of the transcendental psyche.67


61 Yet the converse may also be true. Jung’s un-Kantian moves sometimes gesture towards a possible alliance with Deleuze given Deleuze’s critical comments on a reworking of key Kantian concepts. This is particularly evident with respect to “Ideas”. In this essay I remain somewhat ambivalent about the extent to which Jung’s Self is open to such an alliance, taking the more cautious (or less charitable) view that it has something in common with Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception and therefore becomes a legitimate target of Deleuze’s critique.

62 : Bishop: ‘Finally, the application of noumenal status not only to the archetype-in-itself but also to the archetype of the Self, not to say to the unconscious itself, is – to say the least – highly problematic. And it seems that Jung did not recognise the problem, let alone try to resolve it. Such problems continue to mount when we consider that, reading his texts synchronically rather than diachronically, Jung tried to consider the archetype both as a psychic thing-in-itself and as a category.’ Synchronicity and Intellectual Intuition, 187. Shamdasani refers to this “both” as an ‘unstable compound’. Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology, 236.

63 See Bishop, Synchronicity and Intellectual Intuition, 183-184.

64 Ibid., 182.


67 This paragraph is a paraphrase of the following by Voss: ‘In the case of Kant we can see how the conditions and postulates of the dogmatic image of thought produce a transcendental logic of representation, that is, a logic that relates the dimension of sense to the a priori mental structure of the transcendental subject.’ “Deleuze’s Rethinking of the Notion of Sense,” 14. An example of this in Jung’s thought is evident when he writes the following: ‘it seems to me that the critical standpoint here defined is inescapable. It constitutes the essence,
Jung’s criticism that Kant and post-Kantian thought sought to put man in the place of God misses the point that identity (as constituted finitude: analytic identity and constitutive finitude: synthetic identity) before and after Kant amounts ‘to the same thing’. My contention is that in many aspects of Jung’s work we see its continuance. Bishop outlines Jung’s criticism:

Jung attempted a philosophical context to the Death of God by considering the way in which the concept of the Unconscious had gradually usurped the place of the concept of God in post-Kantian German Idealism. According to this scheme, Schopenhauer had redefined God as the Will, Carl Gustav Carus had replaced God with the Unconscious, and Hegel had identified the subject with God and equated reason with ‘Geist’. In fact Hegel, the ‘psychologist in disguise’ as Jung called him was the main target of his argument, and he accused Hegelian philosophy of projecting subjectivity into the universal.68

Constitutive finitude undermines our relationship with the world by creating a fracture/gap between it and us. Whilst the post-Kantian’s in various ways attempted to deal with the problem of the gap they did not renounce constitutive finitude as Kerslake indicates:

The Kantian and post-Kantian conception of the task of philosophy is ‘fundamentally modern’ in that what is at stake is no longer the finitude of the human mind, opposed to a divine intellect or transparently rational truth, but the ‘constitutive power of human finitude’. It is precisely this finitude that is recovered by the post-systematic Kantian philosophers.69

Yet the extent to which the post-Kantian’s pursued constitutive finitude was found wanting by Jung as well as Deleuze. Whilst for the latter many post-Kantian’s make a move towards trying to determine genetic conditions of experience rather than conditions of possibility (particularly Salomon Maimon),70 they all, in some fashion, ‘subordinated the principle of difference to the principle of identity’ (or organic unity, or totality) and they still privileged the role of the subject which ‘has an important role to play as the highest manifestation of the Absolute, the implicit teles of its self-differentiation.’71

The following comment by Deleuze regarding Hegel can be considered in light of Jung’s views on Hegel’s philosophy outlined above:

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68 The Dionysian Self, 336-7.
69 Kerslake, Immanence and the Vertigo of Philosophy, 20. Cited, WIG? 151. Elsewhere Kerslake has written: ‘On the one hand, the post-Kantians intended to remain faithful to the central claim of Kant's Copernican turn (that “objects must conform to our cognition”), while on the other hand, they were committed to eradicating all the presuppositions that hampered the purity of Kantian critique […] For them, the key to this move was to deepen Kant's notion of transcendental apperception, or self-consciousness. On that basis, the true attainment of first principles could be achieved through a genetic and systematic approach, rather than through the procedure of finding conditions.’ “Deleuze, Kant and the Question of Metacritique”, 482: emphasis added.
70 For an account of the influence of Maimon’s thought on Deleuze’s reworking of Kant see Anne Sauvagnargues, “The Problematic Idea, Neo-Kantianism and Maimon’s Role in Deleuze’s Thought,” in At the Edges of Thought, ed. Craig Lundy and Daniela Voss (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 44-59.
72 Voss and Lundy, “Introduction,” in At the Edges of Thought, 10.
In the grand Leibnizian analysis it is the finite self which is introduced into the development of the infinite, whereas in the grand Hegelian synthesis, it is the infinite which is reintroduced into the operation of the finite self.\(^{73}\)

It is interesting how Deleuze and Jung’s criticisms of the efforts of Hegel appear to align. The ‘projection of subjectivity into the universal’ and/or the infinite projected into subjectivity appear little different. Indeed when Deleuze compares Leibniz and Hegel elsewhere in *Difference and Repetition* he states that they both pursued the thought of difference; Leibniz as infinitely small differences and Hegel as contradiction, the infinitely large limit of difference. These are both models of infinite representation and the problem with this according to Deleuze is that:

> in the last resort infinite representation does not free itself from the principle of identity as a presupposition of representation. That is why it remains subject to the condition of the convergence of series in the case of Leibniz and to the condition of the monocentering of circles in the case of Hegel. Infinite representation invokes a foundation. While this foundation is not the identical itself, it is nevertheless a way of taking the principle of identity particularly seriously, giving it an infinite value and rendering it coextensive with the whole, and in this manner allowing it to reign over existence itself.\(^ {74}\)

Did Jung regard the “universal” in the way that Deleuze understood ‘infinite’ and ‘infinite representation’? I think it is unlikely. Jung does not appear to distinguish between God and the form of identity and this may be one reason why the ‘speculative death of God’ and Nietzsche’s proclamation of the ‘Death of God’ is not pursued by Jung in a Nietzschean direction to the extent that it is by Deleuze, i.e. freeing difference from a primary unity, the dissolution of the self, a transcendental field freed from subordination to the Self, the World and God.\(^ {75}\) “Subjectivity” for Jung is not the same as “identity” for Deleuze and implicit subjective presuppositions that are projected into God ‘before and after Kant’ remain in Jung’s account of the ground to a certain extent.

Although in *What is Grounding?* Deleuze is keen to remove himself ‘from the inflationary metaphysical aspects of the Hegelian system, such as the identification of the dialectic with the unfolding of God’s essence’\(^ {76}\) he would oppose the view that man puts himself in the place of God, seeking instead to answer the question ‘[i]s there no way to account for a unity of concept and intuition within the concept, while maintaining the finitude of understanding as constitutive?’\(^ {77}\) His answer seems to run along these lines: ‘The point of view of the system replaces the concept of infinite understanding, through the transcendental imagination which is that of constitutive finitude.’\(^ {78}\) I shall return to the notion of constitutive imagination and Jung’s use of *esse in anima* in the following section. What Deleuze tries to develop in his early engagement with Kant is a theory of constitutive finitude that supports a ‘philosophy of the imagination’.\(^ {79}\)

At this stage of my discussion what I refer to as Jung’s criticism of Kantian and post-Kantian constitutive finitude results in affirming his partial return to pre-critical grand rationalism. It is a return to the infinite in which constituted finitude is the limitation of something infinite. When Jung locates the psyche in the noumenal, beyond time and space (impermanent, immutable, unchanging) but with a (pre-established) metaphysic of purpose, what is founding is not finitude but the infinite. The internal condition of psychic experience as an Other, the fracture opened up by constitutive finitude, is closed by appeal to the noumenal as its condition and one to which we can become adequate. It would be a return to a “classical” and “innocent” starting point as suggested by Deleuze:

\(^{73}\) *DR*, 70
\(^{74}\) Ibid., 60.
\(^{75}\) Recall one of Bishop’s criticisms that Jung’s early ‘reworking of Kant’s transcendental subjectivity shows that it remained unaffected by Nietzsche’s deconstruction of the subject’ and indeed that ‘Jung may well have held on to this view more determinately for having read Nietzsche.’ *The Dionysian Self*, 33; emphasis added.
\(^{76}\) Ibid., 19.
\(^{77}\) *WIG?* 159.
\(^{78}\) Ibid.
\(^{79}\) *WIG?* 40.
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In all the cases the point [the classical philosophers] start from is infinity. Philosophers have an innocent way of thinking starting from infinity, and they give themselves to infinity. There was infinity everywhere, in God and in the world. That let them undertake things like the infinitesimal analysis. An innocent way of thinking starting from infinity means a world of creation.80

The genesis of psychic experience, its internal, unthought or outside, cannot be determined from the side of the conditioned. The unity of what we might refer to as the ‘whole-Self’ in Jung’s thought is maintained by the psyche which is the curious condition of possible psychic experience grounded as first principle in the noumenal. Psychic experience is immanent to this condition. Jung’s rejection of constitutive finitude (probably regarding it as an inflation of ego-consciousness and reason at the expense of the unconscious), results in a rejection of a form of grounding as positive transcendence.

What I mean by this is rather than retaining a notion of the passive self (of psychic experience) - which is a limitation on the infinite, and ascribing powers of syntheses to a transcendent ground which imposes them but which itself remains external to the contingencies of empirical nature and history remaining unaffected by difference - positive transcendence designates a structure of subjectivity in which the finite ‘is itself infinite in its self-overcoming’.81 This “transcendence”, Deleuze tells us, ‘used to refer to the state of something transcendent’ but, ‘with Heidegger, it becomes the movement of self-transcendence.’82 This self-transcendence ultimately serves to undermine the fracture but in doing so it does not connect us with that which is essentially unchanging, or, in another form, that which resembles what it is supposed to ground.83 Positive “transcendence” is an act that does not refer to a ground outside, superior or external to the world, one which would cover over internal difference with identity. Hughes asks; ‘is this act of pure transcendence not an unexpected Fichtean moment in Heidegger’s thought?’84

We have seen how Jung’s “unusual” treatment of the Ding-an-sich in his Zofingia Lectures gestures towards a type of transcendence which is conceived as the temporary transcendence of the

81 Hughes, “Ground, transcendence and Method in Deleuze’s Fichte,” in At the Edges of Thought, 152.
82 WIC7 25. Joe Hughes has analysed this in detail in his paper “Ground, Transcendence and Method in Deleuze’s Fichte,” in At the Edges of Thought, 146-167. He writes that 'Deleuze’s development of this conception of subjectivity unfolds through a sustained engagement with two texts; Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics and Heidegger’s 1929 treatise, On the Essence of Ground’. (153). What would interest me further would be a comparison between Brooke’s phenomenological account of Jung’s psyche (which draws heavily on Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty) and “transcendence” in the context of individuation. Likewise it would be interesting to compare Fichte’s genetic account of the immediacy of the “I” and its influence on Deleuze’s genetic account of the conditions of “real” experience to the relationship between ‘absolute knowledge’ and ‘intellectual intuition’ in Jung’s work on synchronicity. Hughes’ treatment of Deleuze’s Fichte comes in the context of “transcendence” as immanent to a subjectivity conceived as an act of self-transcendence.
83 It is not an act of intellectual intuition which involves a relativisation of space and time (an ‘exit from time’ or perhaps worse an ‘abolition of time’) in which the coincidence of an immutable “reality” and the passive psyche underscores an ‘immediate access to itself’. See Bishop, Synchronicity and Intellectual Intuition, 46.
84 “Ground, Transcendence and Method in Deleuze’s Fichte,” 154. In the Zofingia Lectures Jung, when discussing “purpose”, refers to “striving” in a manner reminiscent of Fichte on three occasions’ claims Bishop. ‘First he says that: “In the final analysis the striving for happiness can be described as the motivation for every human act”. Second, Jung discusses physical phenomena in terms of a “striving to achieve absolute inertia and a striving towards unlimited change and ceaseless activity”. Third he identifies the “true root of our nature” as “unconditional activity”.’ The Dionysian Self, 35. Cited, Jung, Zofingia Lectures “Thoughts on Speculative Enquiry,” para. 174, 208-15, 225. My inclusion of these passages should not be taken to mean that I consider there to be some kind of parity between Jung’s use of the term “striving” in this context and the “act” of transcendence as an immanent-genetic condition of experience that Hughes derives from Fichte (following Deleuze’s interpretation of Fichte). It is more likely that Jung’s deployment of “striving” was to denote a polarity in which all becoming was implicated. This is unlikely to have been viewed by Jung as a blind becoming (Schopenhauer) but rather as the unfolding of teleological purpose.

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object; ‘everything that eludes our perception’. More commonly though for Jung the *Ding-an-sich* remains a negative borderline concept determining transcendence as the aim and limit of the subject. Both these views of transcendence are inconsistent with the positive act of self-transcendence mentioned above. Of Heidegger’s ‘Fichtean moment’ Hughes writes that the “act” of transcending (surpassing) is one that takes place in a “will” and that this will is “free”: ‘The transcending will projects its own possibilities as a function of its own essence.’ However, for Deleuze the transcendental principle of “real” experience (rather than possible experience) is not to be found in the equivalent of Fichte’s absolute self or in an activity characterised as “freedom”. Rather the principle is to be found at the foundation of a passive self, in sub-representational form, in the intensive flux which the passive self lives. Hughes writes:

One of Deleuze’s more developed accounts of this problem is in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, where the will to power comes to function as this first principle of constitutive finitude, but it is a principle which only becomes free under determinate conditions.

We have seen that when Jung begins to articulate his notion of the soul/psyche in the *Zofingia Lectures* it occurs within a quasi-Kantian and quasi-Schopenhauerian context. In his early speculations about psychic energy (before and around 1912) Jung made more explicit references to Schopenhauer’s “Will” and Henri Bergson’s (1859-1941) *élan vital*. Yet, as Bishop notes, Jung ‘made no mention of Nietzsche’s concept of the Will to power, even though that concept shares more characteristics with the Jungian definition of the libido than does Schopenhauer’s concept of the Will to Life.’ I make these points to underscore what appears to be the difference between Jung’s Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and Deleuze’s Schopenhauer with respect to how transcendence can be characterised. The Will as a ‘fundamentally intransitive form of activity of production’ or the ‘intransitivisation of desire – desire becomes productive at the point where it is no longer tied to representation through lack’, is misunderstood (according to Welchman) if it is conceived of as a

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85 In this “unusual” characterisation that which was transcendent and inaccessible, becomes accessible in the future. Yet what is accessible (either as transcendent and later accessible) is still implicitly thought of in terms of an object (i.e. the Idea as a transcendent object which gets realised/becomes accessible). When Brooks claims that; ‘Schopenhauer, Jung and Heidegger extended Kant’s definition of immanence to include transcendent knowledge (or that which cannot be known), but each in distinct ways with provisos, all acknowledging a limit of what could be known, although with a more or less porous line between what could be apprehended, and what was simply out of bounds’, it is not made clear what the status of ‘transcendent knowledge’ amounts to. See Brooks, “Un-thoughtout metaphysics in Jung’s Analytical Psychology,” 496.

86 “Ground, Transcendence and Method in Deleuze’s Fichte,” 154.

87 Ibid., 159.

88 Shamdasani goes to considerable length to unearth the references Jung makes to Schopenhauer and Bergson (among others) in his survey of the influences on his conception of the libido as psychic energy. See, *Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology*, 220, 221, 225, 226, 227, 249. Scholarship that directly addresses the relationship between the thought of Bergson and Jung remains rare. The most thorough study to date is Kerslake’s *Deleuze and the Unconscious*. Prior to this Pete A. Y. Gunter’s “Jung and Bergson,” (1982) contains numerous insights into the potential “parallels” between core ideas of Bergson and Jung.

89 *The Dionysian Self*, 247-8. Huskinson has also critically assessed the extent to which Jung seemed to misunderstand Nietzsche’s notion of the Will to Power. See “Jung’s Madness: A Nietzschean critique of Jung’s model,” in *Nietzsche and Jung*, 151-157. It seems that Jung’s accusation that Nietzsche was ‘one-sided’ follows from a misunderstanding of the Will to Power which is explained by Welchman as follows; ‘Deleuze argues that Nietzsche’s concept of will-to-power is radically misunderstood if it is treated as a will that “wants…desires or seeks out power as an end”’. Will to power is not, in other words, a transitive will for some particular end. For it to be so would presuppose a representation, since the ‘end’ would be represented. We would be back to Kant’s conception of the will. But as we have seen this is exactly what Schopenhauer rejects: The (transcendental) Will is precisely subtracted from representation and wills without having any particular telos.” “Schopenhauer and Deleuze,” 244. Cited, Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, (1962). Trans. Hugh Tomlinson, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 79.

90 “Schopenhauer and Deleuze,” 240, 251.
formless nothing or ‘lack’ which causes suffering because of its insatiable demands. Indeed, Welchman claims that Schopenhauers

is the arch theorist of lack [the result of] his own subreption. In itself the will lacks nothing, because it does not and cannot represent anything as missing. The will simply wills, intransitively. It is only at the level of individuated representation that the will can be understood as lacking anything. But the problem is not then the will, but the representation.

Jung did not recognise Schopenhauer’s subreption in these terms and Jung’s positive affirmation of teleology represents a way out of the problem of suffering as lack. Jung’s oft quoted criticism of Schopenhauer’s Will from his Memories, Dreams and Reflections (1962), i.e. that Schopenhauer had made a ‘metaphysical statement’ and ‘hypostasised and qualified a mere noumenon,’ a thing in itself, follows the Kantian use of subreption and is ‘more of an indication of Jung’s distrust of the discourse of [rationalist] metaphysics and philosophical terminology than a substantial critique of Schopenhauer.’

The Will, desire, psychic energy as an intransitive form of activity of production, as first principle of constitutive finitude, expresses a principle of force.

Force is not understood as a blind and brutal drive which seeks to destroy and dominate. Forces are rather impersonal flows of energies or intensities, and their effects totally depend on the way they are compounded within a particular field. As such they can either inhibit and prevent critical thought or, on the contrary, increase the critical power.

The positive conception of transcendence peculiar to this view of the will as a site of ungrounding is that it does not seek to provide an a priori ground to thought, rather ‘Deleuze precipitates transcendental philosophy into a “groundlessness” (sans-fond) or “universal ungrounding” (universal effondrement) by dissolving ‘the representational domain into a sub-representational play of intensities or pure differences.’ The first principle of constitutive finitude is a ‘plastic principle’ insofar as it is no wider than what it conditions and changes itself with the conditioned. The “object” to be conditioned remains fundamentally open, i.e. not grounded in reason. The syntheses proper to the genetic conditioning of experience are not organised around the form of rational unified thinking subject (transcendental subject) but belong to a sub-representational passive self. Objects become problematic in this sense when their “legitimate” and “illegitimate” determination by a priori conditions becomes unstable freeing desire/psychic energy from its subordination to such (usually social) conditions, or, for example, to ‘lack’, the Oedipus complex, or perhaps even Self in Jung’s model of the psyche. Problematic objects are not transcendent in the Kantian sense, i.e. beyond possible experience or determinable only in relation to objects of possible

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91 Deleuze writes, ‘Representation, especially when it becomes infinite, is imbued with a presentiment of groundlessness. Because it has become infinite in order to include difference within itself, however, it represents groundlessness as a completely undifferentiated abyss, a universal lack of difference, an inherent black nothingness […] Since groundlessness lacks both individuality and singularity, it is therefore necessarily represented as devoid of any difference. We see this with Schelling, with Schopenhauer, and even with the first Dionysus, that of the Birth of Tragedy: their groundlessness cannot sustain difference. DR, 346.

92 Ibid., 251; emphasis as original.

93 MDR, 88.

94 Bishop, The Dionysian Self, 54.

95 Voss, Conditions of Thought: Deleuze and Transcendental Ideas, 45.

96 Ibid, 2. Cited, Deleuze, DR, ix.

97 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 53.

98 The was certainly the view I upheld in my doctoral thesis where I claimed that what Deleuze refers to as the ‘image of thought’ could be identified in Jung’s depth psychology in his core structural concept of the Self. See, “The ‘image of thought in Jung’s ‘Whole-Self’: A critical study” (unpublished).
experience. Nor do they bear the ideal of determination only in relation to the concepts of the understanding.\textsuperscript{99}

This differs from what we have seen of Jung’s “unusual” definition of the Ding an sich from the Zofingia Lectures. Here the problematic object cannot be productive as it is only temporarily beyond possible experience. In other words it is only problematic (undetermined) temporarily and, when realised in the future as an object of experience (determined) it has brought with it nothing new, being but the realisation of something that was given (in some form) all along.

For Deleuze, Kant never reaches a purely immanent conception of Ideas and given what has been presented of Jung’s account of the thing-in-itself it would seem that he did not. Yet to conclude there would be uncharitable to Jung. Further, it seems as if commentary on the regulative versus constitutive status of Jung’s Ideas as archetypes often ends up simply asserting that Jung was being un-Kantian whereas it may be in his un-Kantian moments, so to speak, that moments of immanence are to be found.\textsuperscript{100} Two examples of such commentary follow. Firstly from Bishop:

First, although Kant’s Ideas are related to a transcendental object, they are not directly related to objective experience. For Kant, the Ideas are not constitutive, but regulative […] For Jung, by contrast, the Ideas – or images – are indeed constitutive, in the sense that they are the product of the activity of phantasy […] Jung’s argument is clearly not a transcendental argument, but a transcendent one. That is to say it is not an argument about the conditions for experience, but an argument about what is, even if only partially, beyond experience.\textsuperscript{101}

Secondly from Huskinson:

Jung’s argument is therefore not a (Kantian) argument about the conditions of experience, but an argument about what is beyond experience. The archetype is at once constitutive and beyond experience. Because it is constitutive, Jung is wrong to correlate it with Kant’s ‘Idea’, and because it is beyond experience, Jung is wrong to correlate it with Kant’s category.\textsuperscript{102}

By contrast Kerslake suggests that “[a]lthough Ideas may only be ‘regulative’ as opposed to ‘constitutive’ for our experience, in a sense they are constitutive of the internal structure of thought. Ideas are the necessary conditions of thought, if not experience.”\textsuperscript{103} What is at issue in the two examples above is the status of ‘beyond experience’. The Idea-archetype can be constitutive of experience if experience is not taken to be limited to transcendental conditions of possibility grounded in reason. This is where the affective and instinctual pole of the archetype is important because these aspects distinguish the Jungian Idea-archetype from Kantian Ideas quite markedly. Indeed, as Kerslake has shown, ‘for both Jung and Deleuze, the notion of Idea is an essential component of

\textsuperscript{99} One will note that I have substituted the term “object” for Idea in these sentences. Not unproblematic I know. I have borrowed from the following by Smith; ‘In an important passage, Deleuze defines an Idea as ‘an internal problematic objective unity of the undetermined, the determinable, and determination’. But, he continues, “perhaps this does not appear sufficiently clearly in Kant”. Why not? Because in Kant: “two of the three moments [in the concept of the Idea] remain as extrinsic characteristics (if Ideas are themselves undetermined [or problematic], they are determinable only in relation to objects of experience, and bear the ideal of determination only in relation to the concepts of the understanding).” “Deleuze, Kant and the Theory of Immanent Ideas,” in Deleuze and Philosophy, 47-48. Cited, Deleuze, DR, 216.

\textsuperscript{100} The following two examples of such commentary deal with occasions where Jung considered himself to be accurately aligning some of his ideas with those of Kant. My inclusion of these passages is not meant as a criticism of the commentaries. However, what I am somewhat indifferent to is the conclusion reached in this commentary: ”It is not clear if his misuse of Kant was of creative intent, or merely a product of his misunderstanding. Regardless, the credibility of his epistemological justifications for his model of the psyche does come under question because of his misuse of these foundational tenets of Kant’s critical philosophy.” Brooks, “Un-thoughtout Metaphysics in Analytical Psychology,” 506.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., 162-3; emphasis as original.

\textsuperscript{102} Nietzsche and Jung, 78.

\textsuperscript{103} Deleuze and the Unconscious, 98.
Kant’s (and their own) theory of cognition.\footnote{Ibid., 90.} As a condition of “real” experience as opposed to possible experience, the archetype-Idea can be likened to the Problem or transcendental “plastic” (first) principle of constitutive finitude considered earlier. This notion of the genetic transcendental condition is Deleuze’s rather than Kant’s and, as I said, it distinguishes Kantian and Jungian Ideas markedly. This point has been made recently in more erudite terms by Eugene Holland:

In relation to Kant, archetypes are Ideas that shape experience through intuition rather than understanding. Archetypal Ideas are understood not as transcendent, stabilising, and totalising solutions to problematic experience (the Identical Self, the Wholly Knowable World, an Omin-Causal God), but as immanent expressions of the many and multifarious Problems experienced in and as human being. What’s more, archetypes are accessible to intuition only through archetypal images, which are (just like Bergsonian tools and institutions) always historically contingent and specific, and represent more or less conscious solutions to unconscious Problems. In exactly the same vein, Deleuze will argue that Problems are unconscious and virtual, knowable only through actual cases of solution (in specific historical institutions and conjunctures), and will conclude that.\footnote{“Deleuze and Psychoanalysis,” 312.}

Hence, Idea-archetypes need only be considered “transcendent” and “beyond” relative to possible experience. Immanent to “real” experience, we can think of archetypes-Ideas as productive genetic transcendental conditions of such experience.

Having made such claims I ask the reader to bear in mind that the Self remains absent from this discussion of archetype-Ideas. Indeed it remains absent from the following section where esse in anima forms the basis of one example of a moment of genetic-immanent thought in Jung’s conception of grounding.

A moment of immanence: Esse in anima as a ground of un-grounding

What Jung mines in Kant’s notion of the regulative Idea is the importance of “illusion” from his model of cognition. Whilst Kant attempts to place limits on what he regards as ‘transcendental illusion’ Jung and Deleuze regard this more positively and it finds a place in their thought regarding the internal structure of cognition. Jung extracts the following relevant passage concerning “illusion” from Kant’s Critique in the course of respectfully challenging Kant’s criticism of Anslem’s (1033-1109) ontological proof for the existence of God:

So great, indeed, is the power of illusion exercised by this logical necessity that, by the simple device of forming an a priori concept of a thing in such a manner as to include existence within the scope of its meaning, we have supposed ourselves to have justified the conclusion that because existence necessarily belongs to the object of this concept – always under the condition that we posit the thing as given (as existing) – we are also of necessity, in accordance with the law of identity, required to posit the existence of its object, and that this being is therefore itself absolutely necessary – and this, to repeat, for the reason that the existence of this being has already been thought in a concept which is assumed arbitrarily and on condition that we posit its object.\footnote{C.G. Jung, Psychological Types, 64. Cited, Kant, Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London and New York, 1929), 500.}

Commenting on this passage Jung claims:

The “power of illusion” referred to here is nothing else than the primitive, magical power of the word, which likewise mysteriously inhabits the concept […] There is evidently something in this “instinctive”
superstition that refuses to be exterminated, because it has some sort of justification which till now has not been sufficiently appreciated.\textsuperscript{107}

In this passage a consideration of relationship between concept and intuition is offered by Jung. He is seeking a way to connect concept and intuition in a manner that reduces the gap which is otherwise evident between Kant’s transcendentally deduced logical conditions of possibility and sensible intuition. Whilst Kant made concepts extrinsic to the thing-in-itself, Jung appears to be attempting to make them intrinsic, thereby reducing the gap between them. “Illusion” is not considered something deflationary and to be limited. Jung’s comments about the role of “illusion” can be read as a kind of critique of formal logic. This logic abstracts from all relation to empirical reality, and the genesis of experience introducing a fundamental distinction between formal logic and the real. Jung’s respectful critique echoes that of the post-Kantian’s on Kant.\textsuperscript{108} Indeed, commenting on formal logic, Jung says that ‘the mistake of the ontological argument consists simply and solely in its trying to argue logically, when in reality it is very much more than a logical proof.’\textsuperscript{109} Although Jung directs this at Anselm, that Kant rules out the ontological argument on the basis of the formal logic he adopts (which takes as its inspiration the Aristotelian table of logical forms of judgement and proceeds by logical inference) this is not the same basis on which Jung’s “abandonment of the ontological argument”\textsuperscript{110} occurs. The basis upon which Jung’s “abandonment” proceeds can ‘be understood as a shift away from reason, proof and postulate to a realm of phantasy’.\textsuperscript{111} Jung establishes the Idea as a psychological “fact” and in so doing invokes a new conception of Kant’s transcendental schematism which reconfigures the gap between possible existence (esse in intellectu) and actual existence (esse in re – or sensory input).\textsuperscript{112}

Before considering this I argue that ‘possible existence’ as Jung understands it, no longer abstracts from all relation to experience. It is certainly not governed by empirical experience. Rather, Jung is replacing transcendental logical conditions of possibility with anima or fantasy, which refers not to possible experience but real experience. In other words with esse in anima Jung is approaching a genetic account of the conditions of real experience. Jung says that ‘logic strips away all content, for it would no longer be logic if a content were to prevail. From the standpoint of logic, there is, as always, no tertium between the logical either-or. But between intellectus and res there is still anima.’\textsuperscript{113} The status of “between” in this passage gives us as clue as to the way in which the ground is being reconfigured by Jung to avoid the problem of identity. de Voogd’s comments help to unpack this further:

Esse in anima [makes the ontological-logical argument superfluous] but not because it mediates between intellectus, res and the ontology that goes with (the opposition between) them. Rather, esse in anima bespeaks an ontology all of its own [...] Esse in anima is a mode of being for which Jung could find no more suitable expression than ‘fantasy’\textsuperscript{114}

As an ‘ontology all of its own’ the ground as esse in anima gestures towards a ground of productive fantasy which is immanently creative. This ground is un-grounding in the sense that it has not been determined within the framework of identity, indeed it un-grounds identities. It is able to do so not because of a binary that pits seemingly non-rational “fantasy” against the rational, but because

\textsuperscript{107}C.G. Jung, \textit{Psychological Types}, 65.

\textsuperscript{108}See Voss and Lundy, “Introduction: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Thought”, in \textit{At the Edges of Thought: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Philosophy}, 4-5.


\textsuperscript{110}de Voogd “Fantasy versus Fiction: Jung’s Kantianism Appraised,” 222 and Bishop, \textit{Synchronicity and Intellectual Intuition}, 154.

\textsuperscript{111}Ibid. See de Voogd “Fantasy versus Fiction: Jung’s Kantianism Appraised,” 222-225.

\textsuperscript{112}Brooks summarises from Jung’s characterisation of the two terms as follows: “esse in intellectu” (universals having their “being in the intellect”, i.e., outside or prior to real things) and esse in re (or universals having their being “in the thing” [or object]). “Un-thought out metaphysics in analytical psychology,” 498.

\textsuperscript{113}C.G. Jung, \textit{Psychological Types}, 66. Bishop uses the term “phantasy” whereas Jung used “fantasy”. For Jung’s definition of the term see par(s), 711-22, 427-433.

\textsuperscript{114}de Voogd “Fantasy versus Fiction: Jung’s Kantianism Appraised,” 224.
the ground itself has been given over to difference as fantasy. What I mean by this is that what Jung calls ‘living reality’ (‘the product neither of the actual, objective behaviour of things nor the formulated idea exclusively, but rather the combination [...] through esse in anima’) places difference within the ground so that the determination of an identity between the ground and the conditioned is ruled out. Rather, fantasy reveals neither a transcendent primordial unity nor the transcendental condition of unity both of which have been determined from the side of the conditioned within the form of identity. From here we might infer that individuation can be likened to a striving to overcome the finite rather than a striving to become adequate with the infinite. This might accord with the positive conception of “transcendence” considered earlier.

**Esse in anima** remains transcendental in terms of being beyond experience but this conception of the “transcendental” is no longer orientated around the deduction of conditions of possibility but of real experience. In this sense *esse in anima* is, (to borrow from Deleuze’s characterisation of the virtual who in turn had borrowed it from Proust), “virtuality: ‘real without being actual, ideal without being abstract’. Resemblance between *esse in anima* and that which is conditioned is ruled out. The investigation of the genetic conditions of real experience through fantasy ensures that the gap or lack of resemblance between these virtual conditions and experience never closes. If it were permitted to close then the conditions would be illicitly copied from or in the image of the conditioned and the ground would be determined from the side of the conditioned. The “between” of possible existence and actual existence (sense) is not characteristic of a relation of mediation by *esse in anima* but rather one where actual existence is determined along with its conditions, it conditions changing as actual existence changes (a bi-directionality). Within the conditioned is a power of internal difference preventing the artificial closure of the conditioned; a movement of un-grounding.

With this in mind what should be made of Bishop’s highly original reading of Jung’s account of fantasy which, ‘inasmuch as it is said to mediate both conceptualisation (in intellectu) and sensory input (in re), is remarkably akin to Kant’s conception of aesthetic judgement in the *Critique of Judgement*.’ Recall that Jung’s positive affirmation of “illusion” establishes the possibility of a fissure through which fantasy can emerge as a governing condition of cognition. For Deleuze:

[I]t is not pure intuition that provides the abstract ground for the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding; it is rather the apprehension of intensive sensible signs that puts us on the path of deciphering the Ideas that, in their intrinsic problematicity, govern experience.

Whilst it is beyond the scope of this essay to present anything near a full account of what ‘intensive sensible signs’ are in Deleuze’s oeuvre, the notion of a problematic Idea cannot be overlooked. Christian Kerslake claims that although:

Jungian’s frequently acknowledge Jung’s debt to Kant, they usually overlook the tripartite structure that Kant gives to cognition – not just conceptual representations and intuitions, but also Ideas, the problems that stimulate the mind in the first place. For both Jung and Deleuze, the notion of Idea is an essential component of Kant’s (and their own) theory of cognition.

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117 I use the term “bi-directionality” with a nod towards the bi-directionality which Harald Atmanspacher claims characterises the relation between the ontic domain and the aspects of matter and mind which he and his adherents refer to as characteristic of the dual-aspect monism in the ‘Pauli-Jung Conjecture’. See *The Pauli-Jung Conjecture and its Impact Today*, ed. Harald Atmanspacher and Christopher A. Fuchs, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2014). I cannot say any more about this at present other than this relationship is dependent on the form of the identical and therefore the ontic domain remains thoroughly conditioned.

118 Bishop, *Synchronicity and Intellectual Intuition*, 156.

119 Kerslake, “Deleuze, Kant and the Question of Metacritique,” 492; emphasis added.

120 *Deleuze and the Unconscious* (London and New York: Continuum Press, 2007), 90; emphasis as original.
Kant’s description of the schematism as ‘a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty’\textsuperscript{121} would, according to Bishop, have ‘doubtless appealed to Jung’.\textsuperscript{122} Likewise Deleuze makes a similar affirmation when he quotes the same line from Kant in \textit{What is Grounding}?.\textsuperscript{123} Now that the basis for at least some affinity between Jung and Deleuze has been established with respect to schematism and fantasy, I suggest that we follow Kerslake’s argument when he writes ‘[i]t is the transcendental imagination which is ultimately constitutive for human experience, and unless we learn the ‘hidden art’ of the imagination to which Kant alluded in his remarks on schematism, the human being is destined to remain enclosed in the \textit{constituted} frameworks of its finitude.’\textsuperscript{124}

Deleuze picks up on the Kantian theory of schematisation when he explains his theory of dramatization.\textsuperscript{125} ‘[H]e dramatizes the schema and renders it dynamical’\textsuperscript{126} i.e. intensive sensible signs or non-representational intensive elements have the power to determine the shape of space and time through reciprocal determination. What Deleuze refers to as spatio-temporal dynamisms, Kerslake will marry with Jung’s archetypes:

Deleuze’s aim is to show how the productive imagination is ultimately a receptacle for the harnessing of problematic Ideas, beyond the norms of conceptual representation [...] Even though Jung’s theoretical suggestions are obscure, Deleuze would certainly have read them with interest, and the fact that he went on to take up the theory of archetypes [...] indicates that he saw an opportunity for theoretical advance here.\textsuperscript{127}

Archetypes as Ideas, or as spatio-temporal dynamisms take the form of problems which transcend the representational and conceptual capabilities of ego-consciousness. As problematic multiplicities they are certainly not theorematic structures that begin with well-defined axioms.\textsuperscript{128} ‘The problem breaks through first as a problem \textit{for} conscious representation, and then as a problem that points to something neglected in the very conceptual hierarchy itself’.\textsuperscript{129} The gap through which Kant claimed the illusory emerged to frustrate the ends of reason,\textsuperscript{130} but which Jung and Deleuze regard as ultimately positive, is that through which fantasy emerges, presenting an immanent problem to which no solution is entirely adequate. The productive imagination responds creatively to a problem that cannot be met by ego-consciousness. The schematism of the productive imagination does not serve to synthesise possible sensations under empty logical forms/possible existence (determined ultimately by the faculty of the understanding to ensure that the unity of the subject-identity is maintained). Its spatio-temporal dynamisms do not pre-exist, are not dependent on mental structures or logical forms of judgement. Spatio-temporal dynamisms reflect time disengaged from its


\textsuperscript{122} Bishop, \textit{Synchronicity and Intellectual Intuition}, 156.

\textsuperscript{123} ‘[Schematism] is a secret art residing in the depths of the human soul, an art whose true stratagems we shall hardly ever divine from nature and lay bare for ourselves’ (\textit{Critique of pure reason} A142/ B181).’ 161.

\textsuperscript{124} Kerslake, \textit{Immanence and the Vertigo of Philosophy}, 21.


\textsuperscript{126} See Voss and Lundy, “Introduction: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Thought”, in \textit{At the Edges of Thought: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Philosophy}, 9

\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Deleuze and the Unconscious}, 91.


\textsuperscript{129} \textit{Deleuze and the Unconscious}, 97.

\textsuperscript{130} With this in mind Kerslake says that ‘[t]he irony here, of which Deleuze is fully aware and is poised to use for his own purposes, is that while this ultimate destination of reason would seem to signal precisely the transparent realization of reason that would fulfill the project of the immanent critique of reason, this rational transparency is secured only on pain of \textit{reason continuing to deceive itself}.’ “Deleuze, Kant and the Question of Metacrítica,” 493; emphasis added.
subordination to the form of a transcendental psyche/subjectivity and the form of the identical in unity.

As a consequence, the sensible (*esse in re*) is also liberated from this subordination and capable of transcendental investigation through fantasy as presented in the archetypal symbol. Deleuze describes the new sense of the sensible in this oft quoted passage from *Difference and Repetition*:

Empiricism truly becomes transcendental and aesthetics an apodictic discipline, only when we apprehend directly in the sensible which can only be sensed, the very being of the sensible: difference, potential difference and difference in intensity as the reason behind qualitative diversity. It is in difference that movement is produced as an “effect”, that phenomena flash their meaning like signs. The intense world of differences, in which we find the reason behind qualities and the being of the sensible, is precisely the object of a superior empiricism.\(^{131}\)

This is the site of a potential meeting between Jung’s individuation and Deleuze’s method of investigating the conditions of real experience he called ‘transcendental empiricism’.\(^{132}\) The ground is no longer a psyche to which psychic experience is immanent. Rather, we find that we are constituted immanently within a transcendental field ‘of intensive differences […]’ In Deleuze’s system, this intensive field is the ‘virtual Idea’ and the function of spatio-temporal dynamisms is to ‘dramatize’ or actualize [or incarnate] the Idea.\(^{133}\) In dramatizing virtual problematic Ideas, time liberated or “out of joint,”\(^{134}\) can take on a different character: ‘time passes, duration accumulates, memory eludes us, déjà vu immobilises us, space (distance, rises and falls, vertigo) encloses or threatens us, without are being able to do anything about it.’\(^{135}\) Likewise their dramatization by the productive imagination, by *esse in anima* synthesising sense, not with pure intuitions but virtual problematic Ideas, permits the ‘free play’ of faculties no longer orientated exclusively by the faculty of the understanding and its commitment to recognition in general.\(^{136}\)

In the *Critique of Judgement* (1790), Kant establishes the free play of the faculties in the aesthetic judgement of beauty. Here the faculty of the imagination reflects the aesthetic form of the beautiful object and exercises a spontaneous and creative production of images without being restrained by determining concepts: ‘The beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, pleases universally’ and ‘presupposes no concept of what the object should be’.\(^{137}\) Whereas in the *First Critique* Kant ranks the faculty of the imagination among the lower cognitive faculties and ascribes to it a mediating role, clearly a change has taken place by the *Third Critique* gesturing towards a certain ‘Kantian “Romanticism”’.\(^{138}\) The productive imagination – being productive without reference to *a priori* concepts orientated by the Understanding – is, according to Bishop, a ‘freedom and

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\(^{131}\) *DR*, 68-69’ emphasis as original.

\(^{132}\) I cannot consider this in detail here but I return to it briefly near the end of this section of the essay.

\(^{133}\) See Voss and Lundy, “Introduction: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Thought”, in *At the Edges of Thought: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Philosophy*, 11.


\(^{135}\) *Deleuze and the Unconscious*, 93.

\(^{136}\) ‘In empirical cognition according to Kant, priority is given to the procedure of recognition, which occurs by means of concepts, which have their source in the understanding. Kant understands a concept as a “function,” that is, as “the unity of the action of ordering different representations under a common one” *iCPR* A68/B93) […] If we keep this full picture in mind, we can begin to make sense of a somewhat abrupt act of violence that Deleuze commits on the Kantian architecture within which he is working: his denial of the transcendental significance of the faculty of the understanding.’ Kerslake, “Deleuze, Kant and the Question of Metacritique,” 496-7.


\(^{138}\) See Voss and Lundy, “Introduction: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Thought”, in *At the Edges of Thought: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Philosophy*, 7. Coincidently Bishop notes that ‘Jung’s conception of phantasy is the site of an intersection with the aesthetics of Weimar classicism.’ *Synchronicity and Intellectual Intuition*, 154 n. 22, 167. In seeking to develop some points of alignment between Jung and Deleuze around *esse in anima* I recognise that *esse in anima* is removed from both Weimar classicism and German Romanticism to some extent.
productivity [which] is simply extended to all forms of psychic activity.’ He then quotes the following from Jung:

This autonomous activity of the psyche, which can be explained neither as a reflex action to sensory stimuli nor as the executive organ of eternal ideas, is, like every vital process, a continually creative act. The psyche creates reality every day. The only expression I can use for this is fantasy.139

The ‘free play’ of the imagination when not subordinated to ‘common-sense’ is an exercise or ‘transcendent exercise’ of the faculty. ‘Transcendent’ writes Deleuze, ‘in no way means the faculty addresses itself to objects outside the world but, on the contrary, that it grasps that in the world which concerns it exclusively and brings it into the world.’140 He goes on to say that transcendent exercise should not be traced from the empirical as it is that which apprehends not from the point of view of common-sense. That is to say, the faculties do not align with the goal of recognising one and the same object as recalled, sensed, conceived or imagined. I referred earlier to the problem of the ‘personal equation’ and ‘subjective’ factor in depth psychology as a motivating cause of the search for a ground to ground the ‘common-sense’ of psychic experience. But esse in anima as that destabilising/ungrounding activity of the transcendental schematism cannot maintain the stability of such a common-sense precisely because it has not been determined from the side of the conditioned. Kerslake points out that ‘Deleuze wants to suggest that the understanding is really an abstraction, derived from a particular mode of relating the faculties: what he calls "commonsense."’141 A higher destination for psychic activity is one which would not be possible if deeply curtailed by a ground whose primary function was derived from a mode of relating drawn implicitly from the side of the conditioned. With esse in anima, fantasy, (with its partly emotive, affective, non-rational, instinctive features) as a characterisation of the immediacy of sensibility, is a manifold or multiplicity (Ideas-matrix/archetype-matrix) proper to sensibility itself and its object is intensity.

Psychic experience provides “access” to intensity through fantasy although this does not presuppose an identity or resemblance between sensibility and fantasy. This is because intensity is not something which serves to maintain identity, either of a transcendent kind (e.g. Platonic Idea or Neo-Platonic conceptions of the One) or a transcendental kind (unity of the subject/psyche). Unlike the German Romantics who were ‘looking for just that form of knowledge which is non-conceptual and indemonstrable, but which we know through direct experience [transferring] the traditional concept of intellectual intuition as an exercise of the infinite intellect into the aesthetic sphere’142 the kind of “access” to sensibility offered by esse in anima is not of a “direct” kind. There is no first principle or Absolute constituted as an organic unity or totality in Deleuze’s conception of the whole, as such a principle would be to render identity coextensive with the whole.143 In ascribing primacy to the concept of difference, no longer negatively conceived as a lack of identity, difference is given its own concept preventing the ‘sublation of difference within a higher identity’.144 What we “access” through an investigation of fantasy are genetic conditions of real experience outside of actual experience but still fully real (virtual) and no broader than it. One way to account for the way in which “access” is being conceived in the ‘Deleuze-Jung’ I have briefly outlined is to say how it differs from the German Romantics. For the latter:

[A]esthetic contemplation reveals purposiveness, rationality and values that are intrinsic to nature itself; they took the second part of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment on teleological judgement in a metaphysical sense and introduced a form of teleology into the

139 C.G Jung, Psychological Types, 78, 52.
140 DR, 180.
141 “Deleuze, Kant and the Question of Metacritique,” 497.
142 See Voss and Lundy, “Introduction: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Thought”, in At the Edges of Thought: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Philosophy, 16.
143 See DR (1968), 60.
144 See Voss and Lundy, “Introduction: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Thought”, in At the Edges of Thought: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Philosophy, 14.
While there is overwhelming evidence in Jung’s corpus to situate many of his ideas without inconsistency near those of the German Romantics, I have focussed on esse in anima as a positive moment of immanence of philosophical grounding in Jung because it appears to break with any ascription of primacy to the form of identity. There is no harmony of identity within fantasy between an Absolute ground and psychic experience (whether such harmony is conceived to unfold teleologically or via some kind of immediate intellectual or sensuous infra-intellectual intuition). Rather than concluding that this is a disappointment, we can positively assert that creativity is affirmed in Jung’s (philosophical) thought.

Finally, despite the use of terms such as “faculties” and “experience” (which usually occur only in the context of discussion related to the embodied mind, idealism or transcendental idealism to name but a few), it should be made clear that in not making psychic experience immanent to a ground which treats difference-in-itself as “illusion” the ground is not implicitly copied from the empirical determination of unity in identity. In the context of his work on synchronicity, what I regard as Jung’s investigations on grounding in different contexts throughout his earlier works, finds its deepest elaboration and, concomitantly, Jung’s deepest attempt at seeking to gain greater legitimacy for his depth psychology. I argue that we can examine Jung’s work on synchronicity as study of grounding that explicitly engages with materiality or sense for the first time and which offers a more sustained focus on time than in any of his other works. This is a continuation of his metaphysics rather than its beginning, only here it is deepened into themes that are more commonly associated with metaphysics in philosophy.

In view of what I have said about esse in anima, a consideration of the relationship between Jung’s use of the “psychoid” in synchronicity and Deleuze’s notion of the ‘transcendental field’ can be advanced. Briefly, in extending to archetypes a ‘non-psyche’ aspect, i.e. by giving them the power to affect matter, Jung’s metaphysics now locates esse in anima firmly beyond any former correlation that might have equated psychic with psychic experience exclusively. Just as Deleuze sought to ‘construct a new metaphysics that replaces the old one (where the Self, the World and God were the highest forms of identity)’ so, through the psychoid-archetype-idea, we begin to investigate the problematic structure of matter itself. This is not to be conceived along the lines of a microcosmic identification with the macrocosmic; two closed systems. Instead it is because we are constituted “in” the transcendental field - a process of immanent psychification - that we remain “open”. The ‘psychic scale’ or “spectrum” that Jung introduces to connect the psychic and the

147 “Deleuze, Kant and the Transcendental Field” in At the Edges of Thought: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Philosophy, 37.
148 Jung writes: ‘the unconscious man is made one with his centre, which is also the centre of the universe, and in this wise the goal of man's salvation and exaltation is reached.’ “Transformation Symbolism in the Mass” (1942/1954). In Collected Works, vol. 11, Psychology and Religion: West and East, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), 445. The unus mundus thus describes a consciousness continuous with this One who dwells within and whose indwelling is the precondition of its experiential perception in the heavens above and in the depths of earth below.” John Dourley “Jung’s equation of the ground of being with the ground of psyche”, 516. This characterisation of the relation between ground and consciousness in Jung is testament to the influence of medieval German mysticism (Meister Eckhart, 1260-1328) which stresses a distinction between macrocosm and microcosm. Further Dourley notes ‘The term ‘ground’ would thus suggest both a differentiated monism and a pantheism as native to the foundational movement of the psyche. It suggests a differentiated monism because ego and unconscious as distinguishable agencies in organic interplay constitute a monadic psyche in which the knowable is included in its totality. Within this universal monad the ground and the consciousness which emerges from it remain mutual participants in an all-encompassing, natural unity exclusive of nothing which tolerates no invasion by powers deemed transcendent to it.’ Ibid., 517. Yet this unity does have a “power” transcendent to it which is identity between the two closed systems, ego and unconscious. The relationship of difference between the two is defined negatively as a lack of identity with the goal being the
non-psychic removes a potential binary between two closed systems if we consider *esse in anima* as the scale itself. As a ground of ungrounding *esse in anima* persists in all actual structures in the form of virtual-problematic Ideas or psychoid-archetypes and can be investigated through fantasy.

recuperation (“redemption”) of identity although this is never fully attained. Because the ground is a primary totality it is given, and the movement between ground and grounded/conditioned is towards that which already is rather than that which is to be created anew. Once again this is a “classical” or innocent conception of the ground as infinite totality to which the ego is striving to become adequate. These final comments and apt quotations from Jung serve to reinforce my concerns: ‘Jung in his lengthiest treatment of Eckhart reads him correctly when he identifies Eckhart’s breakthrough as a moment when ego and unconscious, the human and divine, attain an identity beyond distinction. Jung writes, “God disappears as an object and dwindles into a subject which is no longer distinguishable from the ego” (430). Such total regression constitutes for Jung the experience of an identity with the reality of God. He writes simply, “As a result of this retrograde process the original state of identity with God is re-established”.’ Ibid., 519-520; emphasis added, cited C.G. Jung, *Psychological Types* (1921), par. 431.

The triadic structure of this dialectic (“incarnation”, “penetration”, ibid., 523) of development; inchoate unity, birth of ego (differentiation of unity), reintegration is almost the same as that of the German Romantics (Novalis, Schlegel, Holderlin, Shelling and Hegel); ‘the stages of unity, difference, and unity-in-difference’. *At the Edges of Thought*, 14. What remains problematic is was is common to this dialectic, i.e. the problem of infinite representation. For Deleuze, ‘Infinite representation invokes a foundation. While this foundation is the not the identical itself, it is nevertheless a way of taking the principle of identity seriously, giving it an infinite value and rendering it coextensive with the whole, and in this manner allowing it to reign over existence itself.’ *DR*, 60.

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